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“First. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these representations may be termed Likenesses. Second. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs. Third. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as general signs, and these may be termed Symbols.” (C.S. Peirce, On A New Set of Categories)
“C.S. Peirce, whose great importance for the classification of images and signs we have already noted, distinguished between two sorts of images which he called ‘Firstness’ and ‘Secondness’… Peirce does not conceal the fact that firstness is difficult to define, because it is felt, rather than conceived: it concerns what is new in experience, what is fresh, fleeting and nevertheless eternal… Secondness was wherever there were two by themselves: what is what it is in relation to a second. Everything which only exists by being opposed, by and in a duel, therefore belongs to secondness: exertion-resistance, action-reaction, excitation-response, situation-behaviour, individual-milieu… It is the category of the Real, of the actual, of the existing, of the individuated… After having distinguished between affection and action, which he calls Firstness and Secondness, Peirce adds a third kind of image: the ‘mental’ or Thirdness. The point of thirdness was a term that referred to a second term through the intermediary of another term or terms. This third instance appeared in signification, law or relation. This may seem to be already included in action, but this is not so. An action, that is to say a duel or a pair of forces, obeys laws which make it possible, but it is never its law which makes it act.” (Gilles Deleuze, The Movement Image)
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